Preface
Many believe that there is no such thing as proof of God, and no rational reason to believe in Him – it’s all blind faith. Many believe that God is a superstition which was acceptable among serious intellectuals a while ago, but that modern science has illuminated a universe which stands in no need of a creator.
First, I must point out that modern science was almost entirely fathered by the religious. Galileo was a devout Catholic his entire life; both of his daughters became nuns. Gene theory came from Gregor Mendel, a Catholic priest. Newton spent more of his time writing about the Bible than about science. Germ theory came from Louis Pasteur, a lifelong devout Catholic. The big bang theory came from Georges Lemaitre, another Catholic priest. Juan Molina, another Catholic priest, was the first to develop a theory of evolution, and Darwin cited him serially. Max Planck, father of quantum theory, was a Christian whose scientific studies convinced him all the more of his position.
Surely not all of these men thoughtlessly believed in fairy tales? What’s so convincing about this God hypothesis?
Proof
There is a difference between testable evidence and proof. Science is built on testable evidence, and new evidence is always trumping old evidence. For example, if you wanted to learn the latest information about physics, you wouldn’t pick up Archimedes. So much new evidence has come to light since his day that it would be useless.
Proof, on the other hand, is a series of axiomatic deductions which, if sound, make something certain. Imagine you wanted to learn the latest information about triangles. You could pick up a book written by Pythagoras 2,500 years ago, and it would be fully up-to-date. They are still three-sided polygons, and their interior angles still add up to 180°. These axiomatic truths can never change.
So, while I concede that we don’t have “testable evidence” of God, something we could put under a microscope, that isn’t an issue at all. What I am providing here is a proof of God, and proof is much stronger than observational evidence. The three men pictured at the top of the site are Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leibnitz – they have all used versions of this same proof over the past 2,500 years. Like Pythagoras’ proof that a triangle’s interior angles add up to 180°, it hasn’t fundamentally changed because it has never needed to change. I am sure that it will still be exactly the same in another 2,500 years.
I will present the proof one premise at a time, with a little explanation under each premise.
1. There are contingent beings (“CB”)
A “contingent being” is an existing thing which is not logically required to exist as such. So, a contingent being may be a teacup, a chair, the sun, or you. All of these beings could have failed to exist, or could have been different. You might also substitute the word “contingent” with “conditional.”
Maybe you are a strict determinist, and you think that things couldn’t be any other way than they are. That does not disprove contingency. It may be incompossible with reality that these particular things fail to exist, but it’s still logically possible, and that’s the definition of contingency – logical possibility of being otherwise.
2. CB have explanations
Imagine a team of detectives investigating a theft. After much searching, one of them stands up and yells, “aha! I’ve solved it!” The others ask him who committed the crime. He responds, “You fools, can’t you see? There was no crime! There’s actually just no explanation for this broken window’s existence!”
We rely on the idea that contingent beings have explanations every second of every day. The enterprises of science or logical deduction would be vaporized if we were to wholly reject it, as in the absurd example above. As such, very few will reject the principle of explanation wholesale when arguing this point. If that were the case, you could no longer even rely on the fact that your own two hands exist.
However, some do argue that some contingent beings do not have an explanation, citing something like quantum field theory. But there is no reason to think that probabilistic events don’t have an explanation purely because they are probabilistic. And in fact, even if it were true that quantum events had no explanation, it would be impossible to prove:
Imagine you had a quantum coin. You want to prove that the outcome of tossing the quantum coin has no explanation. The only non-arbitrary assumption for the outcome of the unexplainable coin toss would be indifference, and since there are two possible outcomes, that would be odds of 50/50. Now if the outcome was not 50/50, that would be evidence that there is an explanation (since it should be indifferent). But if the outcome was 50/50, that still wouldn’t be evidence of no explanation, because an explainable probabilistic outcome could be uniform. Either way, no number of observations could ever make the no-explanation hypothesis more likely. To the contrary, even the fact that the coin toss has a set of predictable outcomes at all suggests it has an explanation.
100% of evidence gathered in human history supports the claim that contingent beings have explanations, including the fact that real-life complex quantum events operate within a clear framework and can be mapped with great accuracy. Suggesting that any contingent beings don’t have an explanation would carry an enormous burden of proof. It would be a steeper hill to climb than attempting to disprove gravity. And of course, as I’ve shown already, there is no evidence to support the claim. The only logical option is to anticipate that all contingent beings have explanations.
3. (2) The set of CB has an explanation
The set of contingent beings is the totality of all contingent beings. Hume objected to the claim that this set requires an explanation, pointing out that parts of a set don’t necessarily share a certain property with the whole set, like how a house made of small bricks is not necessarily small. Conceding that contingent beings each require an explanation, he posits that the whole set may not.
Indeed, parts and sets do not necessarily share properties. But some parts and sets do demonstrably share properties – the house made of small bricks is not necessarily small, but it is indeed a brick house. We can easily demonstrate that a set of contingent beings requires explanation: you are a set of contingent beings! You are composed of organs, cells, molecules, and so on – and yet, you (the set) have your own explanation, separate from (though intertwined with) the components. A bigger contingent set – perhaps inclusive of the clothes you’re wearing or the room you’re in – would actually require more explanation. This principle holds all the way up to the complete set, which would actually require the most explanation.
4. CB cannot explain themselves
Nothing can cause itself to exist.
To create oneself, one would have to pre-exist oneself. This is obviously a contradiction – nothing can exist before it exists. As such, no contingent being can explain its own existence.
5. (4) The set of CB cannot be explained by a CB
Some contingent beings can serve as explanations for other contingent beings. For example, your parents are contingent, but they explain your existence. However, because no individual contingent being can explain itself, the set of all contingent beings cannot explain itself. Further, an additional contingent being cannot explain the set, because that contingent being would then require an explanation.
Some people think that the chain of contingent beings might be eternal, and thus requires no explanation. However, the principle at play is clearly fallacious – explaining the parts of a set does not explain the set. Suppose you and I were walking through the woods and came upon a stack of green turtles extending into the sky. You ask me what it is, and I say, “oh, very simple. That’s the infinite stack of green turtles. It’s always been there.” This has indeed explained every part of the set – it’s all green turtles, and it goes on forever. But obviously, this explanation only adds to the mystery. Why is the stack there and not somewhere else? How is it even possible? Why is it eternal? Why turtles? Likewise, the chain of contingent beings may indeed be eternal, but what still needs explanation is why the chain is there at all.
6. (5) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)
A non-contingent being is a being which does explain itself – not by creating itself (that’s still a contradiction), but because it is self-evident. For example, if I said “a finite whole is greater than, or equal to, any of its parts,” it would be incoherent to ask why. Or, if I said “bachelors are unmarried,” it would be incoherent to ask why. These truths are self-evident; their explanation is in their definition. Likewise, if I say “a non-contingent being exists,” it would be incoherent to ask why, because to be non-contingent is to exist unconditionally.
To put it another way: the non-contingent being is not self-created, but uncreated; not self-caused, but uncaused. Where other beings have existence as an accident, this being has existence as a property. This is the explanation for its existence.
Kant rejects the idea of a non-contingent being on the grounds that “existence” cannot be a property, only an accident. His argument is that “existence” adds nothing to the concept of something. For example, if you imagine a unicorn and then imagine a unicorn which exists, they are the same idea. Quite true, but “existence” is not the applicable predicate; “necessary (non-contingent) existence” is the applicable predicate. If you imagine a unicorn and then imagine a unicorn which necessarily exists, these are no longer the same idea (more here). Of course, despite “necessary existence” being a real predicate, there is no reason to think that a necessarily existing unicorn is actually real. But there is a good reason to think that a necessarily existing (non-contingent) being is a real thing – namely, the conclusion of premises 1,3, and 6:
C. (1,3,6) A NCB exists
To reiterate the proof in simplified form:
(1) There are contingent beings (“CB”)
(3) The set of CB has an explanation
(6) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)
(C) A NCB exists
The heavy lifting in proving each premise can almost obscure the wonderful simplicity of the proof. Conditional things exist. Conditional things have explanations. The only way all conditional things could be explained is if something exists unconditionally; that is, self-evidently. To deny these premises requires the claim that reality exists for no reason, and as I’ve demonstrated above, this claim is both arbitrary and contrary to practically infinite evidence.
Only one issue remains: we have to explain the fact that the non-contingent being created the set of contingent beings. If we don’t, the set of contingent beings still has no explanation! Luckily, this is a simple task, only requiring a simple deduction about the nature of non-contingency:
The act of creating contingent beings could not change the non-contingent being, since that would make it contingent upon its own act. So, the non-contingent being creates contingent beings self-evidently – it is part of its nature; the act of creation is just as self-evident as its existence. But that does not mean contingent beings are self-evident by extension, because an act is separate from an outcome – “jumping” is separate from “being in the air.” Likewise, the non-contingent being’s act of creation, while simultaneous to the creation of contingent beings, is not the same thing as the contingent beings. In other words: the being’s nature explains the act, and the act explains the contingent set. Even if the contingent set couldn’t practically be otherwise due to the infallible action of the non-contingent being, it could still logically be otherwise, and thus retains its contingency.
Non-Contingent Nature
But why stop there? Because this being is non-contingent, it has to be a certain way, so there’s plenty we can deduce about it. You may have noticed that I began referring to the non-contingent being in the singular form. Why? Well, for there to be two non-contingent beings, their separate identities would rely on there being some distinction between them. But the fact that one exists without said distinction would prove that the other is contingent (upon that distinction) (01). Further, anything which can change is contingent by definition, so this being must be immutable (02). And what is immutable cannot be material, since material is inherently conditional (here or there, big or small) – so the non-contingent being must be immaterial (03). Further still, since time is a descriptor of progression, and progression is a form of change, this being must be outside of time – eternal (04).
Essence is what a thing innately consists of, and nature is the expression of essence. So, a dog’s “dog-ness” (innate essence) is expressed by its nature: running on four legs, barking, playing, and so on. Now, any quality of a being either comes from its essence/nature (such as how man’s innate consciousness results in the phenomenon of laughter), or from an external source (such as fire making water hot). So, any distinction from one’s essence would either be contingent upon the preexistence of that essence, or contingent upon the nature of another. But this being is not contingent. As such, this being must be one with its essence/nature – it is one infinite expression of “to be” (05).
Already this is a portrait of a being very distinct from our everyday experience. But there’s far more we can deduce.
Tri-Omni
The non-contingent being cannot be composed of parts, because a composite being is contingent upon its parts. So, it must be absolutely simple (06). That is, when we say this being is “one, immutable, immaterial, eternal, and essence,” these do not describe multiple “building blocks,” like pieces of a puzzle adding up to a complete puzzle. Rather, they all nominally describe one selfsame substance. Now this being is the principle by which all contingent things exist, and is in this sense present to all contingent beings. But because the non-contingent being is simple – selfsame through-and-through – it is wholly present to all contingent beings, whether the smallest particle or the entire set, and present to its whole self. So, it is omnipresent (07).
Power is the ability to act upon something else. An agent’s power is greater the more it has of the form by which it acts. For example, the hotter a thing, the greater its power to give heat; if it had infinite heat, it would have infinite power to give heat. This being necessarily acts through its own nature, as proven above. But it is one with its nature, and thus both must be infinite. Likewise, this being’s power must be infinite, so it is omnipotent. Does omnipotence mean the power to instantiate incoherent concepts, such as a square circle? No; because a contradiction does not have a nature compatible with existence. It is not that this being fails to create contradictions; rather, it is that contradictions fail to be possible (08).
Now, it is demonstrable that knowledge has an inverse relationship with materiality. For example, a rock knows nothing. An animal experiences through sense images which are immaterial (free of the physical matter constituting them), but does not consciously “know” them. A human knows by understanding immaterial abstractions about these sense images. So, knowledge is precisely this layer of immateriality. And further still, knowledge is the only thing which can move material things while remaining immutable, as when the unchanging idea of ice cream causes your physical body to desire and retrieve ice cream. Consequently, this immaterial, immutable being with causal power must be a mind, and its complete immateriality means there is no sensorial nor physical constraint on its capacity for knowledge. Because this being is immutable, simple, eternal, immaterial, and wholly present to all things, it is thus omniscient (09). Its knowledge is reality.
Sentient
The will is the faculty by which the mind’s knowledge and judgment is expressed, just as the appetite is the faculty by which an animal’s sense apprehension and instinct is expressed. The non-contingent being obviously can express knowledge, else there could be no creation, and so certainly has a will. Further, this will, although self-evident, is simultaneously free, and free absolutely, for there is no prior condition to determine nor constrain it (10). But a being with mind and will, which moves itself freely without coercion, is alive. So this non-contingent being is alive, and in fact, more alive than anything else could possibly be (11).
I will use this Being’s name moving forward.
Omnibenevolent
The definition of perfection is “to lack nothing.” For example, a “perfect” game of golf would be 18 holes-in-one, because a golf game could not be more complete. But anything imperfect (incomplete) has some part of itself which could be fulfilled by another, and is thus contingent. So God is self-evidently perfect (12). Aristotle defines goodness as “what all things desire” – that is, goodness is a certain fulfillment of nature. To run is good for a dog, to laugh is good for a human, to swim is good for a fish, and so on. Because God is perfect (complete), He is capable of fulfilling the desires of all beings, and is the origin of all good. God is thus omnibenevolent (13).
Now love is the movement towards what is good (desirable). Love is the fundamental act of the will – that is to say, the will is blind of itself and cannot but move towards what the mind has decided is good. But because God must always know the perfect good due to omniscience, He must always will the perfect good, which is perfect love. God is simple, so He is one with His will. He is thus pure love (14).
But if God is omnibenevolent love, why does evil exist? Well, some preface: only God can be perfect, for all other beings, as a matter of logical necessity, must at least have the imperfection of contingency. So, all created things have perfections and imperfections. A man’s movement is more perfect than a rock because he can self-propel. A man without a limp moves more perfectly than one with a limp. And a very fast man more than a very slow one. A man who could fly would be even more perfect, and so on ad infinitum. So we can see that imperfection (lack) and evil (deprivation) are not “created;” they are just the absence of certain perfections.
Of course, it would be ridiculous to demand God give you wings, as the power to move at all is already a gratuitous perfection. But it would similarly be ridiculous to demand that the evil of a limp be healed. Understanding that all things are gifts is the essence of humility.
What of moral evil? Moral evil is an agent consciously choosing a less perfect good over a more perfect one. Money and life are both good of themselves, for example, but choosing money over someone’s life would be evil. God cannot be the cause of evil when all He ever does is provide gratuitous goods, including the gratuitous perfection of free will. The origin of moral evil is the abuse of God’s natural order.
Conclusion
Simply put: this proof establishes that there either is a non-contingent being, or there is no explanation for reality. There is no alternative option. Saying “I don’t know” is not passively pleading ignorance; it is actively choosing to deny the existence of explanations at an arbitrary point, without a shred of evidence, against practically infinite evidence to the contrary. I must note the irony that it is the self-proclaimed skeptics who proudly perpetuate this most consummate superstition.
The non-contingent being has several plainly self-evident features which immediately rule out things like the universe or the multiverse. It must be one, immutable, immaterial, and eternal. Further, once the more abstract descriptors such as “perfect,” “omnipotent,” and “love” are strictly defined, they too describe this being’s self-evident nature.
Simply put: this proof establishes the God of classical theism.