Preface
Many believe that there is no proof God exists and that man is impotent to propose any without the buttress of faith. Many believe that God is a superstition which was acceptable among serious intellectuals a while ago, but that modern science has illuminated a universe which stands in no need of a creator.
First, I must point out a curious irony in this assessment: modern science was almost entirely fathered by the religious. Galileo was a devout Catholic his entire life; both of his daughters became nuns. Gene theory came from Gregor Mendel, a Catholic priest. Newton spent more of his time writing about the Bible than about science. Germ theory came from Louis Pasteur, a lifelong devout Catholic. The big bang theory came from Georges Lemaitre, another Catholic priest. Juan Molina, another Catholic priest, was the first to develop a theory of evolution, and Darwin cited him serially. Max Planck, father of quantum theory, was a Christian whose scientific studies convinced him all the more of his position.
Surely not all of these men thoughtlessly believed in the very fairy tales we so often credit them with conquering? What’s so convincing about this God hypothesis?
Proof
First, what is proof? Proof is a demonstration which uses evidence to establish a truth. And what is evidence? Evidence is information which suggests a conclusion.
Is all evidence scientific, derived from experimentation? Certainly not. For example, Euclid’s theorem that all three-sided, two-dimensional polygons’ interior angles add up to 180° is not based on anything observed under a microscope. Yet, this fact does not make it a weaker proof – it makes it stronger. How? Because instead of relying on the dozens of tenuous assumptions and methodological limitations empirical science does, Euclid’s proof relies solely on basic logical axioms. This is why Aristotle’s Physics is considered archaic while triangle sum theorem is still just as fresh as the day it was penned. Experiments go out of date constantly; basic logical axioms don’t.
The three men pictured at the top of the site are Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leibnitz – they have all used versions of the following proof over the past 2,500 years. I am sure that it will still be almost exactly the same in another 2,500 years. How do I know? Because it is a timeless logical proof, not a transient experimental hypothesis. The only assumptions this proof relies on are (a) that we perceive reality with some measure of fidelity and (b) that logic works – science itself relies on a vastly greater number of assumptions than this! The basic fact of God’s existence is just as fundamental as triangle sum theorem; to deny either means descending into philosophical madness. This is fantastic news, is it not? We have all we need to prove God exists, and need never fear some lab coat coming along and proving it wrong!
With that, let us begin:
1. There are contingent beings (“CB”)
A “contingent being” is an existing thing which is not logically required to exist as such. So, a contingent being may be a teacup, a chair, the sun, or you. All of these beings could have failed to exist, or could have been different. You might also substitute the word “contingent” with “conditional.”
Maybe you are a strict determinist, and you think that things couldn’t be any other way than they are. That’s fine; determinism has nothing to do with contingency. It may be incompossible with reality that these particular things fail to exist, but it’s still logically possible, and that’s the definition of contingent: that which could be otherwise without causing contradiction. To demonstrate this point: imagine you came home and your house was on fire. You wouldn’t say, “ah, determinism is at it again!” as if the situation were self-evident. Clearly, even under a deterministic paradigm where your house practically had to be on fire, your house still logically could’ve been not-on-fire. Contrast the proposed contingent necessity of this unfortunate inferno with an actual self-evident logical necessity, such as A<A+1. Unlike the first example, A<A+1 failing to be true under any circumstance is a logical contradiction.
2. CB have explanations
Imagine a team of detectives investigating an apparent breaking and entering. After much searching, one of them stands up and yells, “aha! I’ve solved it!” The others ask him who committed the crime. He responds, “You fools, can’t you see? There was no crime! There’s actually just no explanation for this broken window’s existence!” The others are a bit confused and ask what he means – they suggest there must be some reason the window is like that. “No,” he responds, sighing a bit at their naivete, “there is no reason; it’s broken, and that’s all there is to it!” The other detectives, now enlightened, acknowledge his brilliance and immediately close the case.
Hopefully this silly little anecdote makes clear the absurd ramifications of wholly rejecting that contingent things can be explained. Most recognize this, and so very few will make this argument. Anyone who would, I invite you to put your money where your mouth is and stop looking both ways before you cross the street. Some will argue that some contingent beings do not have an explanation, usually citing quantum field theory. But this has two glaring issues. First: even if I grant that quantum superpositions collapse randomly, the states they can collapse into are limited (they don’t morph into horses), deterministically predictable (Schrödinger equation), and produce particular emergent properties. This suggests that, even if wave function collapse is random, there’s an explanation for why it’s random: the dictates of the contingent nature of subatomic particles. Second: though I’ve generously granted true randomness, it’s impossible to actually prove:
Imagine you had a quantum coin. You want to prove that the outcome of tossing the quantum coin has no explanation. The only non-arbitrary assumption for the outcome of the unexplainable coin toss would be indifference, and since there are two possible outcomes, that would be odds of 50/50. As such, if the outcome was not 50/50, that would be evidence that there is an explanation. But if the outcome was 50/50, that still wouldn’t prove the no-explanation theory, because an explainable probabilistic outcome could be uniform – perhaps the quantum coin mirrors deterministic coins. And (back to the previous paragraph) even if it actually were random, the nature of the outcomes (random heads or tails) would still be contingent on the nature of the quantum coin.
Attempting to prove that any contingent beings lack explanation would be a steeper hill to climb than disproving gravity. And of course, as I’ve shown already, no evidence exists to support the claim – not even in theory. The only rational option is to anticipate that contingent beings are uniformly explainable.
3. (2) The set of CB has an explanation
The set of contingent beings is the totality of all contingent beings. Hume objected to the claim that this set requires an explanation just because the parts do, pointing out that parts of a set don’t necessarily share particular properties with the whole set – for example, a wall made of small bricks is not necessarily a small wall. But parts and sets aren’t necessarily dissimilar either – for example, a wall made of bricks is indeed a brick wall. This is a case of the latter, not the former, for all composite sets are inherently contingent upon their parts. The brick wall is contingent upon the bricks; if the bricks vanished, the wall would vanish. The contingent set is contingent upon the contingent beings; if the beings vanished, the set would vanish. As such, the set of CB unequivocally requires explanation.
Some try to counter this argument by suggesting that the set of contingent beings is eternal, or has an eternal component. True or false, this is plainly irrelevant. Suppose you asked me why a given brick wall exists, and I responded “oh, because it’s eternal.” Far from explaining anything, this just modifies the contingent being. Instead of asking, “why is the brick wall there?” you would just ask “why is the brick wall eternally there?”
4. CB cannot explain themselves
This follows from the definition of contingent. What is contingent can be other than it is without logical contradiction; ipso facto, their explanations cannot be self-evident. For example, if I ask you why a red ball exists, “because it’s a red ball” is not a satisfying answer. “It created itself” – as is sometimes bandied about regarding the origin of our universe – is not a coherent answer either, since something pre-existing itself in order to create itself is a logical contradiction. You have to reference something other than the red ball to explain the red ball. Contrast this with A<A+1. The truth of this statement is not contingent on anything, it is simply self-evidently true under all circumstances.
5. (3,4) The set of CB cannot be explained by a CB
Some contingent beings can serve as explanations for other contingent beings. For example, your parents are contingent, but they explain your existence. However, because no individual contingent being can explain itself, the set of all contingent beings cannot explain itself. Neither can an additional contingent being explain the set, because that contingent being would just become part of the set.
Hume disputed this, claiming that explaining the existence of each member of a set explains the existence of the set. But this is clearly absurd. Suppose you and I were walking through the woods and came upon a stack of green turtles extending into the sky. You ask me what it is, and I say, “oh, very simple. That’s the infinite stack of green turtles. Each turtle generates the next turtle. It’s always been there.” This has indeed explained every part of the set – each green turtle generates the next ad infinitum. But obviously, this “explanation” only adds to the mystery. Why is the stack there and not somewhere else? How is it even possible? Why turtles? Likewise, though we may be able to explain each being in the chain of contingent beings, that doesn’t explain why the chain is there at all.
6. (5) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)
A non-contingent (unconditional) being is a being which does explain itself – not by creating itself (remember, that’s a contradiction), but because it is self-evident. The fact that it’s non-contingent is the explanation for its existence: it’s unconditional, it’s fundamental, it must be so in all possible worlds, like A<A+1. To put it another way: the non-contingent being is not self-created, but uncreated; not self-caused, but uncaused. Where other beings have existence as an accident, this being has existence as a property. It is existence, to be itself, the very act and ground of being.
Kant rejects the idea of a non-contingent being on the grounds that “existence” cannot be a property, only an accident. His argument is that “existence” doesn’t modify a concept – for example, if you imagine a dollar and then imagine a dollar which exists, these are the same idea. This is a good point, but “existence” is not the applicable predicate; “unconditional existence” is the applicable predicate, and this does modify the concept. A dollar and a dollar which unconditionally exists are not the same idea (more here). And though a “non-contingent dollar” seems to be impossible (since dollars are obviously contingent) there is a good reason to think that a NCB is actually real – namely, the conclusion of premises 1,3, and 6:
C. (1,3,6) A NCB exists
To reiterate the proof in simplified form:
(1) There are contingent beings (“CB”)
(3) The set of CB has an explanation
(6) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)
(C) A NCB exists
The heavy lifting in proving each premise can almost obscure the wonderful simplicity of the proof. Contingent (conditional) things exist. Contingent things have explanations. The only way all contingent things could be explained is if something exists unconditionally; that is, self-evidently. To deny these premises requires the claim that reality exists for no reason, and – as I’ve demonstrated above – this claim is arbitrary, unsupportable in principle, and contrary to practically infinite evidence.
Now, of course, we cannot stop there. This argument has two steps: first, we have proven that the NCB exists. Now we must prove that the NCB is alike to what we call God:
Non-Contingent Nature
Because this being is non-contingent, there’s a lot we can deduce by simply considering definitional contrarieties to contingency. You may have noticed that I began referring to the non-contingent being in the singular form. Why? Well, for there to be two non-contingent beings, their separate identities would rely on there being some distinction between them. But the fact that one exists without said distinction would prove that the other is contingent (upon that distinction) (01). Further, anything which can be changed is contingent by definition, so this being must be immutable (02). And what is immutable cannot be material, since material is inherently conditional (here or there, big or small) – so the non-contingent being must be immaterial (03). Further still, since time is a descriptor of progression, and progression is a form of change, this being must be outside of time – eternal (04).
Essence is what a thing innately consists of, and nature is the expression of essence. So, a dog’s “dog-ness” (innate essence) is expressed by its nature: running on four legs, barking, playing, and so on. Now, any quality of a being either comes from its essence/nature (such as how man’s innate consciousness results in the phenomenon of laughter), or from an external source (such as fire making water hot). So, any distinction from one’s essence would either be contingent upon the preexistence of that essence, or contingent upon the nature of another. But this being is not contingent. As such, this being must be one with its essence/nature – it is one infinite expression of “to be” (05).
Already this is a portrait of a being very distinct from our everyday experience. But there’s far more we can deduce.
Tri-Omni
The non-contingent being cannot be composed of parts, because a composite being is contingent upon its parts. So, it must be absolutely simple (06). That is, when we say this being is “one, immutable, immaterial, eternal, and essence,” these do not describe multiple “building blocks,” like pieces of a puzzle adding up to a complete puzzle. Rather, they all nominally describe one selfsame substance. Now this being is the principle by which all contingent things exist, and is in this sense present to all contingent beings. But because the non-contingent being is simple – selfsame through-and-through – it is wholly present to all contingent beings, whether the smallest particle or the entire set, and present to its whole self. So, it is omnipresent (07).
Power is the ability to act upon something else. An agent’s power is greater the more it has of the form by which it acts. For example, the hotter a thing, the greater its power to give heat; if it had infinite heat, it would have infinite power to give heat. This being necessarily acts through its own nature, as proven above. But it is one with its nature, and thus both must be infinite. Likewise, this being’s power must be infinite, so it is omnipotent. Does omnipotence mean the power to instantiate incoherent concepts, such as a square circle? No; because a contradiction does not have a nature compatible with existence. It is not that this being fails to create contradictions; rather, it is that contradictions fail to be possible (08).
Now, it is demonstrable that knowledge has an inverse relationship with materiality. For example, a rock knows nothing. An animal experiences through sense images which are immaterial (free of the physical matter constituting them), but does not consciously “know” them. A human knows by understanding immaterial abstractions about these sense images. So, knowledge is precisely this layer of immateriality. And further still, knowledge is the only thing which can move material things while remaining immutable, as when the unchanging idea of ice cream causes your physical body to desire and retrieve ice cream. Consequently, this immaterial, immutable being with causal power must be a mind, and its complete immateriality means there is no constraint on its capacity for knowledge. Because this being is immutable, simple, eternal, immaterial, and wholly present to all things, it is thus omniscient (09). Its knowledge is reality.
Sentient
The will is the faculty by which the mind’s knowledge and judgment is expressed, just as the appetite is the faculty by which an animal’s sense apprehension and instinct is expressed. The non-contingent being obviously can express knowledge, else there could be no creation, and so certainly has a will. Further, this will, although self-evident, is simultaneously free, and free absolutely, for there is no prior condition to determine nor constrain it (10). But a being with mind and will, which moves itself freely without coercion, is alive. So this non-contingent being is alive, and in fact, more alive than anything else could possibly be (11).
I will use this Being’s name moving forward.
Omnibenevolent
The definition of perfection is “to lack nothing.” For example, a “perfect” game of golf would be 18 holes-in-one, because a golf game could not be more complete. But anything imperfect (incomplete) has some part of itself which could be fulfilled by another, and is thus contingent. So God is self-evidently perfect (12). Aristotle defines goodness as “what all things desire” – that is, goodness is a certain fulfillment of nature. To run is good for a dog, to laugh is good for a human, to swim is good for a fish, and so on. Because God is perfect (complete), He is capable of fulfilling the desires of all beings, and is the origin of all good. God is thus omnibenevolent (13).
Now love is the movement towards what is good (desirable). Love is the fundamental act of the will – that is to say, the will is blind of itself and cannot but move towards what the mind has decided is good. But because God must always know the perfect good due to omniscience, He must always will the perfect good, which is perfect love. God is simple, so He is one with His will. He is thus pure love (14).
But if God is omnibenevolent love, how does evil exist? Well, some preface: only God can be perfect, for all other beings, as a matter of logical necessity, must at least have the imperfection of contingency. So, all created things have perfections and imperfections. A man’s movement is more perfect than a rock because he can self-propel. A spry man moves more perfectly than a heavyset man. One who could fly would be even more perfect, and so on ad infinitum. So we can see that imperfection (lack) is not “created”; it is just the absence of certain perfections.
Of course, it would be ridiculous to demand God give you wings, as the power to move at all is already a gratuitous perfection. But is it ridiculous to demand the remedy of impediments to proper function (“privations”), such as a leg having a limp? After all, if one man could cure another man’s limp effortlessly, he would seem morally bound to do so. While this may be the case, the man would be required to do that because he is human. God isn’t. God created the human moral universe; He is not Himself bound by it. Just as God created the law of conservation of energy without being bound by it, God created the human moral order without being bound by it. Ergo, just as we cannot judge fish on their ability to read Dickens, we cannot judge God’s goodness based on man’s moral precepts.
Conclusion
Simply put: this proof establishes that there either is a non-contingent being, or there is no explanation for reality. There is no alternative option. Saying “I don’t know” is not passively pleading ignorance; it is actively choosing to deny the existence of explanations at an arbitrary point, without a shred of evidence, against practically infinite evidence to the contrary. I must note the irony that it is the self-proclaimed skeptics who proudly perpetuate this most consummate superstition.
The non-contingent being has several plainly self-evident features which immediately rule out things like the universe or the multiverse. It must be one, immutable, immaterial, and eternal. Further, once the more abstract descriptors such as “perfect,” “omnipotent,” and “love” are strictly defined, they too describe this being’s self-evident nature.
Simply put: this proof establishes the God of classical theism.