Preface

Many believe that there is no proof God exists and that man is impotent to propose any without the buttress of faith. Many believe that God is a superstition which was acceptable among serious intellectuals a while ago, but that modern science has illuminated a universe which stands in no need of a creator. Contrary to this, God’s existence can be proven with even fewer assumptions than the enterprise of science relies upon. What follows is the strongest such proof, premise by premise, with responses to objections at each step.

Proof

First, what is proof? A proof is something which, assuming certain axioms, uses deduction to establish a definitive conclusion. For example, Euclid assumes his postulates, and proves that, under these axioms, all three sided polygons’ interior angles add up to 180°. Natural science, on the other hand, relies on testing observations to inductively work backwards to the applicable axioms. Euclid’s contemporary, Xenophanes, thought the earth was the center of the solar system because he assumed the stars were close by (having no way to test that hypothesis) and observed they stayed in the same (relative) position year after year. Obviously, his observation that the stars were close by ended up being wrong, thus sullying his otherwise reasonable conclusion. Observations and experiments can be deficient in practically infinite ways. As such, there are similar stories from every realm of natural science over the past 2,500 years.

Why am I discussing this? Because many demand a scientific demonstration that God exists and view it as a cop-out when apologists say God categorically cannot be demonstrated in this fashion; however, while God cannot be demonstrated through inductive natural science, God can be demonstrated through a deductive logical proof. As we have seen, deductive proofs are actually more definitive than natural science – if the axioms are true and the proof is valid, then the proof is absolute. So, which axioms must we assume in order to prove God exists? All we must assume is that we perceive reality with just enough fidelity that logic works. This should be most agreeable; after all, without accepting this axiom, one couldn’t even do science in the first place! If you don’t struggle with crippling incredulity about whether gravity is real, you’ve already assumed more than enough for this proof to work.

With that, let us begin:

1. There are contingent beings (“CB”)

A “contingent being” is an existing thing which is not logically required to exist as such. So, a contingent being may be a teacup, a chair, the sun, or you. All of these beings could have failed to exist, or could have been different. You might also substitute the word “contingent” with “conditional.”

Maybe you are a strict determinist, and you think that things couldn’t be any other way than they are. That’s fine; determinism has nothing to do with contingency. It may be incompossible with reality that these particular things fail to exist, but it’s still logically possible, and that’s the definition of contingent: that which could be otherwise without causing contradiction. To demonstrate this point: imagine you came home and your house was on fire. You wouldn’t say, “ah, determinism is at it again!” as if the situation were self-evident. Even under a deterministic paradigm where your house physically had to be on fire, it still logically could’ve been not-on-fire. Contrast the proposed contingent necessity of this unfortunate inferno with an actual self-evident logical necessity, such as A<A+1. Unlike the first example, A<A+1 failing to be true under any circumstance is a logical contradiction.

2. CB have explanations

Note: a later premise will specifically address the brute fact objection.

Imagine a team of detectives investigating an apparent breaking and entering. After much searching, one of them stands up and yells, “aha! I’ve solved it!” The others ask him who committed the crime. He responds, “You fools, can’t you see? There was no crime! There’s actually just no explanation for this broken window’s existence!” The others are a bit confused and ask what he means – they suggest there must be some reason the window is like that. “No,” he responds, sighing a bit at their naivete, “there is no reason; it’s broken, and that’s all there is to it!” The other detectives, now enlightened, acknowledge his brilliance and immediately close the case.

Hopefully this silly little anecdote makes clear the absurd ramifications of wholly rejecting that contingent things can be explained. Most recognize this, and so very few will make this argument. Anyone who would, I invite you to put your money where your mouth is and stop looking both ways before you cross the street. Now, some will argue that some contingent beings do not have an explanation, usually citing quantum field theory. But this has two glaring issues. First: wave function collapse is not indifferent (50/50) – which we would expect if it was random – but rather follows the deterministic Schrödinger equation. Second, even if I grant that quantum superpositions collapse randomly, the controlled randomness seems to have an explanation: the (contingent) nature of subatomic particles. If wave function collapse really had no explanation, we’d expect true randomness, like the wave function arbitrarily collapsing into a horse or something.

Attempting to prove that any contingent beings lack explanation would be a steeper hill to climb than disproving gravity. And of course, as I’ve shown already, no shred of evidence exists to support the claim. The only rational option is to anticipate that contingent beings are uniformly explainable.

3. (2) The set of CB has an explanation

The set of contingent beings is the totality of all contingent beings. This is usually reckoned to be the universe or the multiverse. This set is obviously dependent on its constituent parts, meaning it is itself a contingent being. Thus, it follows from P2 that the set of contingent beings has an explanation.

Hume objected to this claim, pointing out that parts of a set don’t necessarily share particular properties with the whole set – for example, a wall made of small bricks is not necessarily a small wall. But parts and sets aren’t necessarily dissimilar either – for example, a wall made of bricks is indeed a brick wall. Now, we see examples around us of contingent sets having explanations. For example, the brick wall has an explanation as to why it’s organized just so (the builder). Since we have examples of explainability being transitive between discrete contingent beings and contingent sets, there’s no good reason to assume that once the set reaches a certain arbitrary size the property would vanish. Thus, the contingent set – all contingent beings configured as such – requires explanation, just like any other contingent being.

4. CB cannot explain themselves

This follows from the definition of contingent. What is contingent can be other than it is without logical contradiction; ipso facto, their explanations cannot be self-evident. For example, if I ask you why a red ball exists, “because it’s a red ball” is not a satisfying answer. “It created itself” – as is sometimes bandied about regarding the origin of our universe – is not a coherent answer either, since something pre-existing itself in order to create itself is a logical contradiction. You have to reference something other than the red ball to explain the red ball. Contrast this with A<A+1. The truth of this statement is not contingent on anything, it is simply self-evidently true under all circumstances.

5. (3,4) The set of CB cannot be explained by a CB

Some contingent beings can serve as explanations for other contingent beings. For example, your parents are contingent, but they explain your existence. However, because no individual contingent being can explain itself, the set of all contingent beings cannot explain itself. Neither can an additional contingent being explain the set, because that contingent being would just become part of the set.

Hume disputed this, claiming that explaining the existence of each member of a set inherently explains the existence of the set. But this is clearly absurd. Suppose you and I were walking through the woods and came upon a stack of green turtles extending into the sky. You ask me what it is, and I say, “oh, simple. That’s the infinite green turtle stack. Each turtle generates the next. It’s always been there.” This has indeed explained every part of the set – each green turtle generates the next. This issue is, it explains every being by using another contingent being, and thus fails to finally explain itself. An “explanation” such as this only adds to the mystery. Why is the stack there and not somewhere else? How? Why turtles? Likewise, explaining every contingent being in our set in this fashion wouldn’t explain why the set is there at all.

Some would instead take the route of proposing a “brute fact” explanation. That is, a contingent being which existed or exists for no reason and explains the set. Recall that my axiom is not strictly the principle of sufficient reason, but rather that we perceive reality with just enough fidelity that logic works. As such, this possibility can theoretically be admitted. Unfortunately for my interlocutors, I can nonetheless demonstrate that this hypothesis leads to absurd conclusions which would violate the axiom. Consider the following:

Here is a common formulation: suppose we assume that the universe is the contingent set, and suppose the Big Bang could be a brute fact. It seems that with only one brute fact – a relatively low “metaphysical price tag” – we could tidily explain everything! But this leads to a second question: how do we explain the continued existence of the contingent set? Is the mere absence of some destroying force enough to explain it, as some would claim? Certainly not – if nothing intrinsic to me has the power of sight – namely, eyes – the presence or lack of an obstruction is irrelevant to whether I can see. Likewise, the mere absence of a destroying force is not enough to explain the universe’s continued existence. So we must persist in asking the question.

Is the power to exist supplied by something external to the universe? If so, this concedes my argument that something external to the contingent set finally explains it. Then perhaps instead, each fundamental particle continues existing by some inherent inertia? But we cannot thus explain the existence of a particle by a property, for properties rely on the objects that possess them for their existence, making this answer circular. Well, we could say that each fundamental particle is a brute fact which continues in existence for no reason with brute fact properties which just so happen to uniformly manifest in time, space, coherent laws, life, consciousness and so on. But now our “low price tag” brute fact has quickly morphed into everything being a brute fact! This conclusion is absurd, and so violates our axiom.

6. (5) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)

A non-contingent (unconditional, necessary) being is a being which does explain itself – not by creating itself (remember, that’s a contradiction), but because it is self-evident. The fact of non-contingency is the explanation for its existence: it is unconditional, fundamental, it must be in all possible worlds, like A<A+1. To put it another way: the non-contingent being is not self-created, but uncreated; not self-caused, but uncaused. Where other beings have existence as an accidental property applied to an object, this being simply is existence. We thus avoid circularly proposing that the object causes the property and the property causes the object – there is no object. The NCB is pure, essential existence through and through; to be itself, the fundamental act and ground of being.

Kant rejects the idea of a non-contingent being on the grounds that “existence” cannot be ontologically essential, only an accident. His argument is that “existence” doesn’t modify a concept – for example, if you imagine a dollar and then imagine a dollar which exists, these are the same idea. This is a good point, but “existence” is not the applicable predicate; “unconditional existence” is the applicable predicate, and this does modify the concept. A dollar and a dollar which unconditionally exists are not the same idea (more here). Now, of course, a “non-contingent dollar” is self-contradictory, insofar as dollars are obviously contingent. But we do have good reason to think a NCB is actually possible and real – namely, the conclusion of premises 1,3, and 6:

C. (1,3,6) A NCB exists

To reiterate the proof in simplified form:

(1) There are contingent beings (“CB”)

(3) The set of CB has an explanation

(6) The set of CB can only be explained by a non-contingent being (NCB)

(C) A NCB exists

The heavy lifting in proving each premise can almost obscure the wonderful simplicity of the proof. Contingent (conditional) things exist. Contingent things have explanations. The only way to reasonably explain all contingent beings is by something not contingent – something necessary, or unconditional. To deny these premises requires the claim that the contingent set exists for no reason, and – as I’ve demonstrated above – this is in all cases arbitrary, contrary to practically infinite evidence, unsupportable in principle, and quickly leads to untenable conclusions.

Of course, we cannot stop there. This argument has two steps: first, we have proven that the NCB exists. Now we must prove that the NCB is alike to what we call God:

Non-Contingent Nature

Because this being is non-contingent, there’s a lot we can deduce by simply considering definitional contrarieties to contingency. You may have noticed that I began referring to the non-contingent being in the singular form. Why? Well, for there to be two non-contingent beings, their separate identities would rely on there being some distinction between them. But the fact that one exists without said distinction would prove that the other is contingent (upon that distinction) (01). Further, anything which can be changed is contingent by definition, so this being must be immutable (02). And what is immutable cannot be material, since material is inherently conditional (here or there, big or small) – so the non-contingent being must be immaterial (03). Further still, since time is a descriptor of progression, and progression is a form of change, this being must be outside of time – eternal (04).

Essence is what a thing innately consists of, and nature is the expression of essence. So, a dog’s “dog-ness” (innate essence) is expressed by its nature: running on four legs, barking, playing, and so on. Now, any quality of a being either comes from its essence/nature (such as how man’s innate consciousness results in the phenomenon of laughter), or from an external source (such as fire making water hot). So, any distinction from one’s essence would either be contingent upon the preexistence of that essence, or contingent upon the nature of another. But this being is not contingent. As such, this being must be one with its essence/nature – it is one infinite expression of “to be” (05).

Already this is a portrait of a being very distinct from our everyday experience. But there’s far more we can deduce.

Tri-Omni

The non-contingent being cannot be composed of parts, because a composite being is contingent upon its parts. So, it must be absolutely simple (06). That is, when we say this being is “one, immutable, immaterial, eternal, and essence,” these do not describe multiple “building blocks,” like pieces of a puzzle adding up to a complete puzzle. Rather, they all nominally describe one selfsame substance, like how pure white light refracts many colors through a prism without being reducible to them, or how one king’s ultimate authority is expressed through many administrators. Now this being is the principle by which all contingent things exist, and is thereby present to all contingent beings. But because the non-contingent being is simple – selfsame through-and-through – it is wholly present to all contingent beings, whether the smallest particle or the entire set, and present to its whole self. So, it is omnipresent (07).

Power is the ability to act upon something else. An agent’s power is greater the more it has of the form by which it acts. For example, the hotter a thing, the greater its power to give heat; if it had infinite heat, it would have infinite power to give heat. This being necessarily acts through its own essence, since it has no accidents. But it is one with its essence, and since its essence is infinite, its power must be infinite. So it is omnipotent. Does omnipotence mean the power to instantiate incoherent concepts, such as a square circle? No; because a contradiction does not have a nature compatible with existence. It is not that this being fails to create contradictions; rather, it is that contradictions fail to be possible (08).

Now, it is demonstrable that knowledge has an inverse relationship with materiality. For example, a rock knows nothing. An animal experiences through sense images which are immaterial (free of the physical matter constituting them), but does not consciously “know” them. A human knows by understanding immaterial abstractions about these sense images. So, knowledge is precisely this layer of immateriality. And further still, knowledge is the only thing which can move material things while remaining immutable, as when the unchanging idea of ice cream causes your physical body to desire and retrieve ice cream. Consequently, this immaterial, immutable being with causal power must be a mind, and its complete immateriality means there is no constraint on its capacity for knowledge. Because this being is immutable, simple, eternal, immaterial, and wholly present to all things, it is thus omniscient (09). Its knowledge is reality.

Sentient

The will is the faculty by which the mind’s knowledge and judgment is expressed, just as the appetite is the faculty by which an animal’s sense apprehension and instinct is expressed. The non-contingent being obviously can express knowledge, else there could be no creation, and so certainly has a will. Further, this will, although self-evident, is simultaneously free, and free absolutely, for there is no prior condition to determine nor constrain it (10). But a being with mind and will, which moves itself freely without coercion, is alive. So this non-contingent being is alive, and in fact, more alive than anything else could possibly be (11).

I will use this Being’s name moving forward.

This point raises a difficulty: the divine will explains the contingent set, but what explains the divine will choosing to create the contingent set? First, we must clarify the two ways one can be open to opposites. One can be open to opposites either due to a potency within oneself, as when one lacks information, or due to potency in an object, as when one pencil or another pencil may both sketch the same image equally well. Creation is to God as the latter, since creation is nothing without God and can thus never add anything to His goodness, only reflect it, as a window can never add to the sun’s light (CG1). So, although God necessarily wills the divine goodness, it is not necessary that He manifest this creation or that creation or any creation in order to do so (CG2).

Now that we’ve clarified God’s total creative freedom, we can answer the question. The solution goes back to divine simplicity: there are no parts in God, which means He is His will, which means His will to create is uncaused (CG3). God’s will is the primordial limit; there’s nothing prior to appeal to. But God’s choice to create one thing or another does not cause any change in Him. The divine will is uncaused in all possible worlds; it’s always ontologically identical, so creative freedom implies no potency, change, nor necessitation in God Himself; rather, all potency belongs to creation. There is a similar explanation for the problem of God knowing things other than Himself. God really only knows Himself, and creation by likeness to Himself, again implying no potency nor change in God’s knowledge – Himself – but all potency in creation’s likeness to Him (CG4). These contradict necessitarianism.

Omnibenevolent

The definition of perfection is “to lack nothing.” For example, a “perfect” game of golf would be 18 holes-in-one, because a golf game could not be more complete. But anything imperfect (incomplete) has some part of itself which could theoretically be fulfilled by another, and is thus contingent. So God, who exists unconditionally, is perfection itself (12). Now goodness is that which is desirable. A thing is more desirable than another according to some greater perfection. But God possesses perfection essentially, and God is the primary cause of all good things. Since God is perfection and the source of all goodness, we know God is not an object which is accidentally superior to the others, as one boiling pot of water is hotter than another pot due to different proximities to fire; rather, God is as the fire which heats the water – God is goodness itself (13).

Now love is the movement towards what is good (desirable). Love is the fundamental act of the will – that is to say, the will is blind of itself and cannot but move towards that which the mind decides is good. Evil stems from some error in the mind leading it to seek a lesser good; for example, we say the miser is evil insofar as he seeks the lesser good of money over the greater good of kindness. But God, being omniscient, always knows the perfect good, and there are no passions within Him which could distract Him from it (He is immaterial) nor anything which could impede His knowledge. Thus, He always knows the perfect good, which means He always wills the perfect good, which is perfect love. God is simple, so He is one with His will. He is thus pure love (14).

Problem of Evil

If God is perfect love, where does evil come from? As we’ve discussed, God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent meaning He’s perfectly rational and perfectly powerful. Nothing can confuse Him about what’s good, and nothing can distract Him nor stop Him from enacting the greatest good. But remember also that God cannot instantiate contradictions like square circles. Together, these points suggest one conclusion: God permits particular evils for the sake of manifesting His love in the particular manners He desires. Arthur Conan Doyle permits Moriarty to commit crimes so that he can manifest Sherlock’s brilliance. God permits men to commit crimes so that He can manifest heroes to triumph over them. Certainly, this does not explain every evil particularly, as if all were as simple as the hero example. God could permit some evil today which will not bear the desired fruit for generations. Rather, this explains every evil principally.

When we say “permit,” we describe a different relationship God has with evil than with good. Remember that goodness really exists, whereas evil is just the lack of a certain perfection. God causes goodness, but does not cause evil, He merely refrains from creating certain perfections when this is suitable. If I pay someone to fix something, you could cause that I’ve caused them to do that good thing, and this is analogous to God bestowing perfections on creation. But if I refuse to give an armed robber my wallet and he kills me, you cannot say I’ve caused him to do that; I could have prevented it by giving him the money, but I am in no way culpable for my death. This is analogous to God permitting evil.

And why does God desire to manifest His love in those particular ways? After all, God is perfect; it’s not as if creation can add anything to Him. Indeed this is true; but overcoming evil does add something to the creature who does it. The martyr who sacrifices his life to save the city is truly more heroic for having done it. God wills to permit the sin of the persecutor because He loves the martyr. He doesn’t love the martyr because of their heroism; this isn’t transactional, God gave the martyr all those perfections which impel him to save the city in the first place. Rather, God loves the martyr prior to his heroism, and thus wills his heroism to manifest that love. The only reason for this love is the divine wisdom, which is uncaused, uncreated, and above reason. For more on this topic, you can read here.

Conclusion

Simply put: this proof establishes that there either is a non-contingent being, or there is no explanation for reality. There is no alternative option. Saying “I don’t know” is not passively pleading ignorance; it is actively choosing to deny the existence of explanations at an arbitrary point, without a shred of evidence, against practically infinite evidence to the contrary. I must note the irony that it is the self-proclaimed skeptics who proudly perpetuate this most consummate superstition. Further, the non-contingent being has several plainly self-evident features which immediately rule out things like the universe or the multiverse. It must be one, immutable, immaterial, and eternal. Further, once the abstract descriptors such as “perfect,” “omnipotent,” and “love” are well-defined, they too self-evidently describe this nature.

Simply put: this proof establishes the God of classical theism. 

Now, as a final note: let it not be said that this is the only argument for God’s existence. Although I think this is the best argument, we may support it in a number of ways. First, by dismantling atheism as a metaphysical proposition, as done here. Second, by fortifying the argument with other arguments that point to God’s existence, as done here and here. This can be useful for two reasons. First, some arguments which are objectively not as good as others may be received better subjectively. Second, one may subjectively consider these arguments plausible as opposed to definitive, and in this case adding more and more probability to the idea that God exists by presenting multiple strong arguments can be a meaningful exercise.